There is a volume of literature that believes there is a significant gap between citizens and the EU, which explains voter apathy. This gap is termed by ‘democratic deficit’ the definition of which was first used by a 'British Labour party academic, David Marquand; the weakness of the democratic legitimacy of the European Community Institutions' (Milvev, 2004). There are arguments back and forth about the size, significance, and impact of such a deficit.
There is a Democratic Deficit
Institutions
According to Robert Dahl (1999, pg. 19), democracy requires political institutions that ‘provide citizens with opportunities for political participation, influence and control’. If we take this as an explicit definition of ‘democratic’, the EU can be seen as undemocratic. The EU Parliament, despite its powers being increased, remains very much secondary to the Commission and Council.
This is a point furthered by Follesdal (2006), who claims that the European Parliament is weak compared to national governments in the Council. Although the European Parliament has equal legislative power with the Council under the co-decision procedure, a majority of EU legislation is still passed under the consultation procedure, in which the Parliament has only a limited power of delay.
Furthermore, arguments are made that the EU, whilst moving towards a role of governance, has failed to balance power amongst its institutions. The European Parliament is perceived as weak, not only due to its lack of legislative power, but due to by its lack of grip on regulatory and budgetary control of the European Council and European Commission.
There is not a Democratic Deficit
Indirect Democracy and the influence of National Parliaments
Moravcsik argues that the EU is 'unfairly regarded as undemocratic, largely because most analysts tend to view the EU in isolation, and thus fail to appreciate fully the symbiotic relationship between national and EU policy making' (Follesdal and Hix, 2006). There is a division of labour in which commonly delegated functions tend to be carried out by the EU, while those functions that inspire and produce popular participation remain largely national. This gives observes only the impression that the EU is undemocratic, whereas it is simply specializing in those functions of modern democratic governance that tend to involve less direct political participation.
Furthermore, he argues, constitutional checks and balances, the indirect democracy of national parliament influence, and the increasing powers of the European Parliament are sufficient to ensure that EU policy making is, in nearly all cases, clean transparent, effective, and politically responsive to the demands of European citizens.
Institutions and functions of the EU
To counter the arguments that the institutional make-up of the EU is fundamentally undemocratic, Moravcsik argues that, thanks to its increased powers, the directly elected European Parliament has been progressively usurping the role of the Commission as the primary agenda setter vis-à-vis the Council in the EU legislative process.
Moravcsik continues, stating how constraints on the EU’s freedom of action can be seen to enhance its claim to being democratic. The requirement of unanimity, followed by electoral, parliamentary, or administrative ratification, to amend treaties, points to the how institutional constraints allow the influence of nationally elected officials on EU policy. Furthermore, he argues, the EU employs two ‘robust mechanisms’, which guarantee the safeguarding of democracy. Direct accountability is experienced via the European Parliament, and nationally elected officials account for indirect accountability.
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