Origins

Pollack(2009:125) argues that the new Institutionalism(s), in political science, did not originate in the field of EU studies, but reflected a gradual and diverse reintroduction of institutions into a large body of theories (such as behaviourism, pluralism, Marxism, and neorealism), in which institutions had been either absent or epiphenomenal, i.e. reflections of deeper factors or processes such as capitalism or the distribution of political power in a given domestic society or international system.

In contrast to the institution-free accounts of politics, which dominated American political science between the 1950's and the 1970's, three primary 'institutionalisms' developed during the 1980's and early 1990's, each with a distinct definition of institutions and a distinct account on how they matter in the study of politics (March&Olsen 1989 and Hall&Taylor 1996 in Pollack,2009:125).

Rosamond(2000:114) states that historical institutionalism grew out of critiques of conventional group theories of politics, while rational choice institutionalism reflects the successful import of the axioms of microeconomics into political science. Sociologists also became interested in the capacity of cultural and organizational practices within institutions to mold the preferences, interests and identities of actors in the social world; hence the word sociological institutionalism (Rosamond 2000:114).

Over the past decade the three institutionalisms have arguably become the dominant approach to the study of European integration, by offering substantial advantages over the traditional neofunctionalist and intergovernmental theories.

Key Thinkers

New institutionalism has seen restored centre on the research of institutions in disciplines like sociology, economics and politics.

John W. Meyer suggested early definition of new institutionalism. He stated that institutional regulations operate as myths which groups absorb, acquiring authority, supplies, firmness and improved continued existence chances (Meyer and Rowan 1977).

Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell argued that organizational structure begin from the group restriction applied by the state and the businesses. The attempts to accomplish sensibility with unpredictability and limitation lead to similarity of structure called institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio, Powell 1983).

In economics science, the new institutionalism is connected with Douglas North. In his book ‘’ Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance’’ he concluded the problem that institutions change increasingly along present tracks rather than by skipping in the course of finest situation (North 1991).

Theory

Historical Institutionalism took up a position in between the two camps which are rational-choice and sociological institutionalism, by focusing on the effects of institutions over time (Thelen 1999, Pierson 2000 cited in Pollack 2009:127). In contrast to rational-choice approaches, scholars of historical institutionalism tend to reject 'functionalist' explanations for institutional design. Such functionalist explanations assume that institutions have been deliberately design by contemporary actors for the efficient performance of specific functions, such as the provision of policy-relevant information and little attention is paid to historical legacies. Scholars of historical institutionalism oppose this view, arguing that institutional choices taken in the past can persist, or become locked in, thereby shaping and constraining actors in time (Pollack 2009:127). Institutions therefore are 'sticky' and resistant to change, both because of the uncertainty associated with institutional design and because national constitutions and international treaties can impose significant transaction costs and set high institutional thresholds, such as supermajority or unanimous agreement for later reforms to be done (Pollack 2009:127).

Rational Choice institutionalism defining institutions as official narrow bodies and sets of judgements that exploit duties upon self – interested political players (Rosamond 2000: 115).  Based on Hall and Taylor it is possible to show 4 features of this approach:

1. In general, they assume that the significant actors have a resolute set of desires or tastes, behave completely active so as to maximize the achievement of these preferences.
2. Rational choice institutionalism scholars tend to see political science as a sequence of united action problems. What avoids the players from taking a commonly – greater course of manners is the absence of conventional agreements that would guarantee matching conduct by others.
3. Highlight the role of tactical interaction in the resolution of state results. Following by that thinking actor’s action is likely to be managed, not by detached historical compels , but by a planned calculus and, that this calculus will be thoroughly pretended by the actor’s suppositions about how others are likely to act as well.
4. Difficulty of describing how organizations emerge. Intellectuals start by using assumption to appear at a stylized requirement of the operations that an institution presents(1996: 12 – 13).

Sociological Institutionalism defines institutions much more broadly to include informal norms and conventions as well as formal rules, emphasizing their capacity to socialize actors and thereby influence interests and identities (Rosamund 2000:204). Scholars of sociological institutionalism argue that such institutions constitute actors, thus shaping the way in which actors view the world. In contrast with rational choice models, in which actors are regarded as strategic utility-maximizers whose preferences are taken as a given, sociological institutionalist accounts often start with the assumption that people act according to a logic of appropriateness, taking cues from their institutional environment, as they construct their preferences and select the appropriate behavior for a given institutional environment (Pollack 2009:127). When referring to the European Union sociological institutionalist scholars have examined the process by which the EU and other institutional norms are diffused and shape the preferences and behavior of actors in domestic as well as international politics (Pollack 2009:127). Rosamund (2000:119) argues that for sociological institutionalists interests and identities are endogenous to (emanate from within)  the processes of interaction that institutions represent, so that interests as well as the background for action are socially constructed, giving meaning to actors by institutional scripts. There are clear affinities between sociological institutionalism and social constructivism.

Impact

Pollack states that in the past three decades all three new institutionalisms have been adopted by students of European integration (Pollack 2009:129). Rational choice institutionalist analyses of the EU arguably date back to the 1980's, with Fritz Scharph's (1988) pioneering work on 'joint decision-traps' in the EU and other federal systems, and continued into the 1990's and 2000's with work by George Tsebelis, Geoffrey Garrett, and others who sought to model in rational choice terms the origins and above all the workings of EU institutions (Pollack 2009:129). Arguably the best-developed strand of rational choice theory in EU studies has focused on EU legislative processes, with the European Parliament being the subject of extensive theoretical modelling and empirical study (Pollack 2009:129). EU scholars have turned to historical institutionalism in order to understand temporal aspects of European Integration, including phenomena such as feedback effects, lock-ins, and path-dependence (Scharpf 1988, Bulmer 1994, Pierson 1996 in Wiener & Diez 2009:136). Sociological institutionalist scholars have devoted greater attention to the enlargement process, looking closer at the negotiation and bargaining processes between the EU and the candidate countries and its occasional willingness to enter compromises, in order to examine the driving forces behind the entire process (Pollack 2009:138). Rosamund (2000:116) argues that the different institutionalisms have different accounts on how institutions actually matter, therefore each of these approaches takes a particular view on how actor preferences are formed. In sum, the revival of institutionalism in political science represents an attempt to counter the behaviouralist emphasis upon political outcomes as the product of aggregated societal behavior and a crude emphasis on political outputs as derivatives of the of the straightforward interplay of actors' interests (Rosamund 2000:114).

Critique

The ‘’new’’ and ‘’old’’ filaments of institutionalism highlight the importance of institutions. Old institutionalists are against new institutionalism because they look for causes for institutional alteration in terms of political free will.

The new institutionalism developed not so much just to deny some of the ‘’viruses’’ of the older type of analysis but more to discuss about the identified shortcomings of what had come to be proper understanding of politics (Guy Peters 2005:11).

Knowledge about institutions depends upon admiration of involvement, cohesion and progress in time. Veblen (1899) maintained that

the situation of today shapes the institutions of tomorrow through a selective,

coercive process, by acting upon [humans.] habitual view of things, and so

altering or fortifying a point of view or a mental attitude handed down from

the past. .At the same time, [humans.] present habits of thought tend to

persist indefinitely, except as circumstances enforce a change. These

institutions [constitute] the factor of social inertia, psychological inertia,

conservatism.

(Veblen 1899:190-1, cited in Parto, Saeed 2003).

Bibliography

• DiMaggio P.J., Powell W.W. (1983) ‘’The Iron Cage Revised: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’’ American Sociological Review (48:2) 147 – 160

• Guy Peters B. (2005) ‘’Institutional Theory in political science. The ‘’new’’ institutionalism’’, Gosport, Ashford Colour Press Ltd.

• Hall, Peter A. , Taylor R.C.R.( 1996) "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." Political Studies (44:5) 936-957

• Meyer J.W., Rowan B. (1977) ‘’Institutionalised Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony’’ The American Journal of Sociology (83:2) 340-363

• Nugent N. (2004), European Union Enlargement, Palgrave Macmillan

• Parto, Saeed. 2003. "Economic Activity and Institutions," Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL

• Pollack M. (2009), 'The New Institutionalisms and European Integration' in Wiener&Diez (eds.) European Integration Theory, 2nd ed., Oxford: Hampshire pp. 125-144

• Rosamund B. (2000), Theories of European Integration, Palgrave Macmillan

• Schout A.  (1991) ‘’Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance bu Douglas North’’ The Economic Journal (101:409) 1587 - 1589